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The authors consider how service liberalization differs from that of goods liberalization 
in terms of welfare, the levels and composition of output, and factor prices within a 
developing economy, in this case Tunisia.  Despite recent movements toward 
liberalization, Tunisian service sectors remain largely closed to foreign participation and 
are provided at high cost relative to many developing nations.  The authors develop a 
CGE model of the Tunisian economy with multiple products and services and three 
trading partners.  They model goods liberalization as the unilateral removal of product 
tariffs.  Restraints on services trade involve both restrictions on cross-border supply 
(mode 1 in the GATS) and on foreign ownership through foreign direct investment (mode 
3  in the GATS).  The former are modeled as tariff-equivalent price wedges while the 
latter are comprised of both monopoly-rent distortions (arising from imperfect 
competition among domestic producers) and inefficiency costs (arising from a failure of 
domestic service providers to adopt least-cost practices). 
 
They find that goods-trade liberalization yields a modes gain in aggregate welfare and 
reorients production toward sectors of benchmark comparative advantage.  However, a 
reduction of services barriers in a way that permits greater competition through foreign 
direct investment generates large welfare gains.  As a result, service liberalization 
requires lower adjustment costs, measured in terms of sectoral movement of workers, 
than does goods-trade liberalization.  Moreover, it tends to increase economic activity in 
all sectors and raise the real returns to both capital and labor.  Overall welfare gains of 
comprehensive service liberalization amount to over five percent of initial consumption.  
The bulk of these gains come from opening markets for finance, business services, and 
telecommunications.  Because these are key inputs into all sectors of the economy, their 
liberalization cuts costs and drives larger efficiency gains overall.  The results point to the 
potential importance of deregulating services provision for economic development.     2
1.  Introduction 
The dramatic economic growth that visited much of the world in the 1990s has been 
attributed often to a ‘new economy’ arising from global integration.  Yet, the economies of many 
developing countries in Africa and Latin America experienced slower growth or remained 
stagnant.  This history is puzzling as there has been an unprecedented willingness on the part of 
many developing economies to participate in the globalization of merchandise trade.  Through 
both unilateral trade liberalization and agreements reached in the World Trade Organization and 
regional trade accords, many countries sharply lowered manufacturing tariffs and other 
impediments to goods trade.  Nevertheless, as Rodrik (2001) has pointed out, traditional trade 
liberalization seems not to have fully delivered on its promise for prosperity.  In this paper we 
suggest that part of the explanation for this weak performance rests in the continued insulation, 
and resulting poor condition, of the domestic services sectors in many developing countries.  
These service sectors tend to deliver high-cost and unproductive input services to export 
industries, thereby limiting economic efficiency gains from trade reform.  We explore this claim 
in a computational general equilibrium model of the Tunisian economy. 
The mechanisms by which services trade liberalization might improve welfare differ 
from those of goods trade.  As is well known, producers respond to a lowering of border barriers 
in products by reorienting production towards goods in which an economy possesses a 
comparative advantage.  Goods trade thus involves a restructuring of the economy as labor and 
capital move out of import-competing sectors and into export sectors.  Goods trade also tends to 
redistribute income, with abundant factors benefiting disproportionately from liberalization in the 
long run.   
In contrast, trade in services is not solely a cross-border phenomenon.  As the paper by 
Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (1999) points out, many foreign services are best transferred 
through foreign direct investment (FDI) due to the personal contact that is often required between   3
the service provider and client.  Restrictions on FDI or the movement of professional personnel 
may reduce services trade far more than tariffs or other border barriers limit trade in goods.  
Indeed, in many developing countries, Tunisia included, laws and regulatory agencies erect entry 
barriers that essentially rule out FDI in key service sectors. 
Foreign direct investment involves inflows of capital and personnel, but more importantly 
for developing countries it also tends to embody transfers of technology that can upgrade 
productivity in the domestic economy.  Because financial, communications, and professional 
services are key intermediate inputs into production in all sectors, technological improvements in 
these sectors could have the effect of upgrading overall productivity.  Thus, whereas liberalizing 
goods trade moves an economy toward specialization, liberalizing services trade through 
permitting foreign establishments could lead to more balanced output expansion. 
In industrialized countries certain producer services are among the largest and most 
dynamic components of production and employment.  For example, technological innovations in 
information management and telecommunications services have facilitated the global transactions 
upon which the “new economy” has thrived (Lipsey, 2001).   
This situation lies in stark contrast with Tunisia, where there is a large state presence in 
many key service sectors.  Regulatory agencies limit competition by restricting markets available 
to producers.  Foreign participation is also highly restricted and often limited to the services of 
non-resident Tunisian suppliers.  As we discuss below, anecdotal evidence indicates that 
Tunisia’s communication, financial, insurance, distribution, and professional services are 
expensive, of poor quality, and often inaccessible.  An inefficient service sector acts as a drag on 
the entire economy, and especially on trade, as services are critical inputs in production and 
distribution processes.   
In some respects, Tunisia has pursued a strategy of liberalization and alignment with the 
global economy.  However, Tunisia’s 1995 commitments under the General Agreement on Trade   4
in Services (GATS) are few and generally represent a preservation of status quo policies.
1  The 
opening of services markets to foreign suppliers would also involve privatization and 
deregulation.  Policymakers are concerned about whether the economic benefits would justify the 
adjustment costs involved.  Moreover, Tunisian services are supplied by important domestic 
interests, which makes liberalization difficult to undertake without some indication of the 
potential for gains and information on their likely distribution.   
Unfortunately, there are very few empirical studies on services trade and FDI, in part due 
to a variety of measurement problems.  It is against this backdrop that the present study is 
conducted.  We employ a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to compare the impact of 
service liberalization to that of trade liberalization.  We follow GATS definitions and consider, 
separately, liberalization of both cross-border services trade (mode 1) and the establishment of 
domestic presence by foreign direct investment (mode 3).  For this purpose we develop estimates 
of the distortions that the present, relatively closed, environment in Tunisia imposes on the price 
of services.  By simulating the effects of removing these distortions, we are able to quantify the 
impacts of liberalization.  The potential efficiency gains would be large, while output in all 
merchandise sectors would rise, after services liberalization.  Furthermore, the real prices of both 
capital and labor would increase.  
2. Conceptual Issues  
  Trade in services is distinguished from trade in goods by the intangible nature of many 
transactions.  Unlike physical goods, which must cross borders and thus are subject to customs 
procedures and tariffs, services often involve direct transactions between the consumer and 
producer.  This complicates the measurement of both service flows and their corresponding 
impediments.  The founders of the GATS framework recognized the importance of the various 
channels by which services are transacted.  GATS identifies four modes of supply: cross-border 
                                                 
1 Of the twelve service sectors defined under the GATS classification scheme Tunisia made commitments   5
supply (mode 1), consumption abroad (mode 2), commercial presence (mode 3), and the presence 
of natural persons (mode 4).  Thus GATS extends traditional trade law to include both foreign 
direct investment (mode 3) and movements of labor (mode 4).   
Unfortunately, these legal definitions do not accord well with present international 
balance of payments accounting practices, as discussed in detail by Karsenty (2000), making 
difficult the measurement of services trade and its components.  Equally problematic is the 
measurement of impediments to services trade.  Warren and Findlay (2000) and Hoekman (2000) 
provide excellent surveys of these measurement issues.  For example, Hoekman (1995) developed 
a frequency indicator as an initial attempt to quantify the presence of barriers based on the GATS 
schedule of commitments by country.  While this provides some indication of the extent of 
commitments, the index is not designed to measure the level of barriers present.  Francois (1999) 
estimates a gravity model of services trade, adopting Singapore and Hong Kong as free-trade 
benchmarks.  In his approach, discrepancies in predicted trade patterns are used to indicate the 
severity of policy barriers.  Warren and Findlay (2000) describe an ongoing Australian services 
research project that is attempting to measure the wedge between price and marginal cost in 
service sectors in order to get an indication of the impact that impediments might have on prices.  
The project also seeks to develop quantity impact measures by comparing domestic output to 
international standards.  Unfortunately, the study is incomplete and ultimately may not provide 
information that could be applied to developing economies. 
Given severe data limitations, there are very few econometric studies on services trade 
and their barriers.  One advantage of a CGE model is that it can provide quantifiable insights with 
relatively sparse datasets.  Several studies of services barriers exist using the GTAP multi-country 
database.
2  An early model by Brown, et al (1996) converts Hoekman’s frequency indices into an 
approximation of cross-border barriers to services trade and simulates liberalization in the multi-
                                                                                                                                                 
in only three: financial services, tourism, and telecommunications.  These commitments reflect little more 
than a codification of Tunisia’s present legal system.   6
country Michigan model.  Hertel (2000) approximates cross-border barriers with the gravity-
equation estimates of Francois and treats liberalization as an elimination of resource-using 
barriers.  A significant limitation of these models is that they do not capture the potential benefit 
of FDI liberalization.   
More recently, FDI has been incorporated into multi-country GTAP-based models (Dee 
and Hanslow, 2001; Brown and Stern, 2001).  FDI is treated as a capital flow and barriers to the 
right of establishment are modeled as taxes on the existing investment flow and on local sales.  
Liberalization (removal of the tax) results in a global reallocation of capital as sector-level rates 
of return adjust to a new equilibrium.  This approach represents a significant improvement over 
earlier work, which focused only on cross-border trade (Mode 1).   
Nonetheless, although these models inform our understanding of global impacts of 
GATS, they are not adequate for understanding domestic impacts in such highly regulated 
developing economies as Tunisia for two reasons.  First, service sectors that experience no FDI in 
the benchmark economy are assumed to be non-tradable and could not, therefore, be recipients of 
FDI in counterfactual scenarios.  Yet in Tunisia, we might reasonably expect that FDI would 
occur in several important sectors (such as telecommunications or insurance) in which, under 
current policy, foreign suppliers are simply not permitted to serve Tunisian residents.  Existing 
methodologies do not offer a reasonable way to predict how responsive sectors that are inactive in 
the benchmark would be to FDI in a liberalized environment.  Second, the market structure in 
most service sectors in Tunisia is highly regulated and imperfectly competitive, perhaps best 
characterized as cartels.  As Francois and Wooten (2001) discuss, shallow liberalization without 
deregulation could involve essentially an invitation to foreign firms to join the cartel.  Deeper 
liberalization, involving also deregulation permitting new entry, should bring about a more 
competitive market structure than envisioned in earlier models.   
                                                                                                                                                 
2 See Dee, et al (2000) for an excellent survey of this literature.   7
An additional point of departure for our work is to consider the impact of services 
liberalization on the structure of Tunisia’s economy relative to that of trade liberalization.  The 
Tunisia input-output table allows us to disaggregate services into 15 sectors.  We consider the 
regulatory environment at a disaggregated level and are able to compare the relative impact of 
liberalization in individual service sectors.  With data on the manner in which services act as 
intermediate inputs, our simulations are indicative of how service liberalization may restructure 
the domestic economy.   
3.  The Model and Benchmark Data 
  Services play a significant role in the Tunisian economy, as is evident from Table 1.  
Nearly half of all output (excluding tourism) is comprised of services.  Output of commercial 
services has been growing at a faster rate than that of goods.  Services make up one-third of 
household consumption and eighteen percent of intermediate demand according to the 1995 
input-output table (Institute National de la Statistique, 1998).  Of the tradable services, tourism 
plays the most significant role, representing over fifteen percent of imports and more than 19 
percent of all exports.  Tourism export services are considered to be rather open.
3   
There is no statistical information on the importance of FDI in Tunisian services trade, as 
the earnings and sales of foreign-owned subsidiaries are not reported separately from those of 
domestic firms.  However, foreign participation clearly is minimal in the main service activities in 
Tunisia.  This is due to a variety of investment measures, exchange controls and limits on 
movement of foreign personnel.  The most important restriction is the Foreign Commercial 
Activities Law of 1961 (Decree Law Number 61-14), by which non-Tunisians are required to 
obtain a trader’s permit, carte de commercant, to engage in any form of commercial activity.  
This permit, granted on a discretionary basis, has effectively precluded foreign participation in 
most wholesale and retail markets.  The Investment Code of 1993 is also an important barrier to 
                                                 
3 Tourism may be exported without being produced because tourists are treated as “foreign consumers” in   8
majority foreign equity projects, with foreign entry requiring approval by regulatory councils.  
Such approvals are rare and FDI is strictly controlled. 
We employ what is, in most respects, a standard CGE model of a small open economy.  
The full model is discussed below and presented in a technical appendix.  Our contribution is in 
the explicit treatment of services production and investment.  Production decisions in the services 
sector are distorted by regulations that raise entry costs and limit the rights of foreign enterprises 
to establish facilities in Tunisia.  In principle, this restriction distorts prices and quantities through 
two primary channels.  One is the cartel effect whereby barriers to FDI and excessive regulation 
limit both domestic and foreign participants in certain service sectors, thus hampering 
competition and supporting market power on behalf of local firms.  This market power creates the 
opportunity in sector i to charge price markups vi over marginal cost ci.   
(1)   ci (1 + vi) = pi 
The markup depends on the number of firms, price elasticity of demand, and conjectures about 
reactions of rival firms.  We assume that the rents generated by markups accrue to the 
representative agent. 
  Second is a cost inefficiency effect.  Marginal costs in a regulated environment may be 
excessively high as low-cost foreign suppliers are excluded from the market. Additionally, 
domestic suppliers may be forced to absorb into their costs various regulations on provision and 
bureaucratic procedures.  These activities do not contribute to output and generate pure economic 
waste (Hoekman and Konan 2001).  Thus, resource-using service barriers λi raise marginal costs 
above ‘best practice’ marginal costs ci
* that would prevail in a liberalized environment.   
(2)   ci
*(1 + λi) = ci 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the input-output table and enter as a component of final demand.  The production of tourism services exists 
in the other service sectors, such as transportation, hotels, and restaurants.   9
Combining equations (1) and (2) shows that the wedge between price and true marginal costs 
depends on the product of an ad valorem markup and a proportionate waste factor.  Ultimately it 
would be preferable and interesting to locate empirical information on these two wedges in each 
sector in order to simulate the effects of their separate and joint removal.  Unfortunately, we only 
have estimates of the entire price-cost wedge and cannot perform this decomposition except on 
assumed shares.  Thus, throughout the baseline counterfactual scenarios, it is assumed that 
barriers to FDI generate wedges consisting of half rents and half waste.   
Services liberalization involves presenting a domestic cartel the possibility of competitive 
markets with foreign entry.  It is important to note that liberalization does not, in our model, 
generate endogenous changes in FDI flows.  Rather, the scenarios involve changes in ownership 
and market structure in ways that improve efficiency and alter the distribution of rents.  This 
assumption reflects the fact that in several service sectors there is no foreign participation (that is, 
FDI) in the benchmark equilibrium.  In that context it is impossible to determine what the impact 
of liberalization would be on “marginal” FDI flows, which would not be meaningful.  It also 
permits us to retain a fixed aggregate capital stock in the model, rather than engaging in dynamic 
simulations of endogenous investment and capital allocation.  In this context, the estimates of 
welfare changes from liberalization of establishment rules are likely to be understated relative to 
full long-run gains.
4 
Model equations are presented in the appendix and the model is depicted in Figure 1.  We 
assume that production of agricultural, mineral, and manufacturing goods is characterized by 
constant returns to scale and perfect competition, implying that prices equal marginal costs of 
output.
5  Services production is subject to constant returns as well, though in the initial 
                                                 
4 Kehoe (2002) discusses the importance of incorporating changes in trade and investment flows in sectors 
where they had been absent in the computation of new equilibrium outcomes.  This observation stems from 
the chronic tendency of CGE models of NAFTA to underpredict the ultimate impacts of that trade 
agreement on Mexico’s international trade and investment. 
5 This assumption is standard in the literature.  See, for example, Konan and Maskus (2000).   10
benchmark it is monopolized as discussed above.
6  In all sectors, production functions are 
approximated with Leontief technologies using composite intermediate inputs and real value 
added.  A constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function describes the 
substitutability between labor and capital inputs in producing real value added.  Intermediate 
inputs and final goods are differentiated by country of origin according to the Armington 
assumption, so that export and import prices differ across regions.
7  The three trading regions are 
the European Union (EU), the Arab League countries, and the rest of the world (ROW).  In each 
sector, demand for domestically produced and imported goods is represented by a CES function, 
and intermediate imports are also differentiated across regional sources of supply in a CES 
structure.  Similarly, Tunisian industries supply regionally differentiated goods to both domestic 
and foreign markets (exports).  Production follows a nested two-stage constant elasticity of 
transformation (CET) function.  Total output is first calculated as the sum of domestic supply and 
total exports, with the latter then being allocated across the same destination regions according to 
a sub-CET function.  Capital and labor are assumed to be freely mobile across sectors, implying 
that our simulations pertain to long-run outcomes of liberalization. 
  A representative consumer maximizes a nested CES utility function with a corresponding 
multi-staged budget constraint.  In the first stage, the consumer decides how much to spend on 
goods from each sector, given the budget constraint.  Income elasticities across sectors are set at 
unity as given by a Cobb-Douglas (CD) utility nest.  In the second nest, the consumer determines 
domestic and aggregate import expenditures in each sector according to a CES function.  Then 
given a budget for imports, the consumer selects purchases of imports from each region.  These 
latter functions also characterize the split between government consumption and investment 
                                                 
6  It is likely that a number of services, such as telecommunications, transport, and finance, are subject to 
economies of scale and scope.  Thus, our assumption of constant returns may understate the gains from 
liberalization. 
7  De Melo and Robinson (1989) show that models that allow product differentiation are well behaved 
under a small open economy assumption; in effect the economy is a price taker at the level of aggregate 
trade flows and each region’s aggregation is sufficiently distinctive to support the Armington assumption.   11
spending on domestic and imported goods and services. The representative consumer receives 
income from primary factors (labor and capital), net transfers from the government, the current-
account deficit, and any net economic rents from the operation of restrictions on services trade. 
  Two standard closure rules are imposed: the savings-investment balance and a fixed 
current account balance.  The savings-investment balance is based on the assumption that the 
capital stock is exogenously fixed at the benchmark level.  This stock is financed through forced 
consumer savings that acts as a direct (lump-sum) tax.  The interest rate (an index price of the 
composite capital stock) is endogenous and determined by factor demand conditions.  The 
current-account is defined as the sum of the merchandise trade balance, the services balance, net 
foreign worker remittances, and (negative) net payments on foreign capital.
8  We assume that 
foreign reserves will be held constant so that the current account will be just offset by (the 
negative of) the capital account.  The current-account balance itself is held constant in real terms 
throughout the simulations.  Income from foreign remittances less foreign capital payments enters 
as an exogenous addition to the representative agent's income.  To hold the current account 
balance fixed while international prices are constant requires a balancing item.  This is 
accomplished by means of a change in the home "real exchange rate," which refers implicitly to a 
change in the home price index (generated by changes in price of home-produced goods) 
sufficient to sustain a constant current-account balance as import and export volumes change. 
  The government budget deficit is a deduction in available income for the representative 
agent, constituting a transfer to government consumption. The deficit is held fixed during our 
simulations. Thus, if a policy reform causes prices to fall, thereby reducing the tax revenues 
required to finance government expenditures, this tax saving is transferred to the representative 
agent.   At the same time, if trade liberalization results in lost tariff revenues, the revenues are 
recouped by means of allowing household lump-sum tax rates to vary endogenously.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
8 In the 1995 benchmark year, foreign remittances were approximately 650 million Dinars while net capital   12
  The data for the model consist of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and other 
parameters, such as import and export trade flows by region, sectoral tax and tariff rates, and 
elasticities of substitution and transformation.  Because there is little empirical evidence on 
relevant elasticities for the Tunisian market, we make standard assumptions about their values.  In 
particular, labor-capital substitution is set at unity in a Cobb Douglas value added production 
function.  Benchmark trade elasticities are drawn from Rutherford, Rutstrom and Tarr (1995) and 
Konan and Maskus (2000).  The various trade elasticities are 2.0 for substitution between domestic 
and imported goods, 5.0 for substitution among regional imports and for transformation between 
domestic output and exports, and 8.0 for transformation among regional export destinations.  These 
data are assembled into a consistent set of relationships between intermediate demand, final 
demand, and value-added transactions using the 1995 input-output table for Tunisia on a diskette 
provided by the Institut National De La Statistique (INS) along with the 1998 INS Les Comptes 
de la Nation report. 
  Trade and tariff data, provided in Table 2, were aggregated to the input-output sectoral 
basis using import weights consistent with the concordance between the input-output table and 
the tariff classification.  Tariff rates were determined by collections data for 1995 and vary across 
regions due to duty drawback provisions as well as preferential treatment of the EU and the Arab 
League.  There are no data on tariff collections on services, and we take their tariff rates to be 
zero. 
  Table 3 lists our estimate of price wedges due to service barriers, which are the key 
parameters to be altered in the simulations.  Mode 1 barriers on cross-border trade are treated as 
ad valorem tariff-equivalent NTBs.  These are simply set to zero in the liberalization exercises.  
Sectors that are listed as non-traded (indicated by nt) remain non-traded post-liberalization.  In 
terms of mode 3, we would ideally like to estimate the impact that services barriers have on both 
price markups and on resource costs so as to distinguish between the pro-competitive effects and 
                                                                                                                                                 
income totaled negative 680 million Dinars according to the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.   13
the cost-reduction effects.  Warren and Findlay (2000) suggest computing the pro-competitive 
impacts using price-cost margins (or “net interest margins”).  Ideally, we would also like to 
capture the cost-reduction effects by comparing actual costs to a constructed estimate of costs if 
services were provided according to a ‘world’s best-practice’ cost function.  Unfortunately, none 
of these measurements are attainable for Tunisia, as is the case for most countries.  
  The services barriers given in Table 3 are based on industry studies in Tunisia and 
extensive discussions with Tunisian industry experts, country economists and government 
officials and on Zarrouk (2000).  The financial services barriers estimates are taken from our 
observation that the level of monetary intermediation in the banking system is about 30% lower 
than in comparable countries (Bahlous and Nabli 2000) and on Goaied’s (1999) estimation of the 
cost inefficiencies in the financial sector.  This is in line with the estimates of Kalirajan, et al 
(2000) for the banking sectors in Chile, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand.  The price wedges 
in insurance, communications, and transportation reflect the high level of benchmark regulation 
in those sectors and comparisons with markets in similar countries (Vittas 1995, World Bank 
2000).   The distribution and retail sectors show large inefficiencies and are very fragmented, 
making our 5% inefficiency measure conservative.  Many professional services are subject to a 
nationality requirement, thus restricting foreign participation, and it is possible that our 10% 
estimated price wedge is low.  While the construction, hotel, and restaurant sectors are viewed 
here as already substantially liberalized and subject to a small price-cost wedge, foreign 
participation remains subject to the investment code and projects are granted upon approval of a 
Cahier des Charges.  Remaining sectors (health and education, public services, and other 
services) are taken to be exempt from potential liberalization. 
   14
4.  Results 
  The liberalization scenarios considered can be broken down in several ways.  First, 
liberalization of investment barriers in services is considered.  Sensitivity analysis demonstrates 
the importance of the decomposition of the price wedge into resource-using versus rent-
generating barriers.  The second step is to distinguish between liberalization of border barriers 
and investment barriers, broadly.  Next, the impacts of liberalization are broken down on a 
sectoral basis.  The final set of scenarios compares the impact of services liberalization to that of 
traditional liberalization of trade in goods. 
  Table 4 presents potential impacts of lifting barriers to foreign investment in services 
(mode 3 delivery).  As discussed in the previous section, investment barriers are assumed to drive 
an observable wedge between price and marginal cost.  Unobserved is the decomposition of the 
wedge into two sources of distortion: rent-generating (cartel effect) and resource-using 
(inefficiency effect).  Three benchmark possibilities are considered in Table 4.  First (column 
one), assume that the only barrier to foreign investment is one that preserves a domestic cartel 
and thus generates pure economic rents for Tunisian interests.  That is, Tunisian service producers 
are using world-class technologies and face costs equivalent to those of the low-cost world 
producer.  Upon liberalization, foreign entry is assumed to eliminate the price-wedge as markets 
become competitive.  Domestic rents are completely dissipated to the benefit of Tunisian services 
consumers.  The result is a modest gain in welfare of the representative household of one-third of 
one percent, measured as equivalent variation in the representative agent’s real income. 
  At the other extreme (column three), assume services markets are perfectly competitive 
in the benchmark, but that Tunisian firms do not employ world-class production techniques and 
are thus inefficient.  Entry by foreign firms introduces cost-saving innovations and services prices 
fall.  Welfare increases dramatically by nearly eight percent.  This large difference from the initial 
benchmark case reflects the fact that elimination of a pure rent wedge generates a small net gain 
in efficiency from resource reallocation, but most of the gross gains are transfers from the prior   15
rent stream earned by the representative agent.
9  In both cases consumer prices fall about seven 
percent.  Note that while both scenarios increase returns to both labor and capital (non-labor value 
added), labor gains relatively more in the pure rent-wedge case.  This suggests that one effect of 
the protected cartel is to restrain wages in relation to what they would be under full efficiency.  
Capital gains are relatively larger when the pure cost wedge is removed. 
In the remainder of these counterfactual experiments, it is assumed that the price-wedge 
is an equal combination of the rent-generating and resource-using distortions (column 2 of Table 
4).  Thus, in this case the welfare impacts mix efficiency gains with rent losses for the 
representative agent.  This baseline scenario for investment liberalization results in a four percent 
increase in welfare and a seven percent fall in the consumer price index.  The gains from 
liberalization are skewed toward capital, the price of which increases seven percent.  Five percent 
of the capital stock changes sector of employment.  Real returns to labor increase by three percent 
and three percent of the labor force changes sector of employment. 
  The bottom part of Table 4 indicates impacts on major sectoral production shares.  The 
figures in parentheses in the left-most part indicate benchmark output shares before any 
liberalization.  Liberalization itself tends to favor relative output expansion in agriculture and 
services, while restraining the manufacturing and mining shares.  Thus, the initial structure of 
protection for services actually restrains domestic output in that sector.  The remaining columns 
compare these shares across FDI-liberalization cases.  While these shares are essentially stable 
across benchmark assumptions, moving from the rent-wedge case to the efficiency-wedge case 
slightly favors agriculture and manufacturing, while reducing the share of services.   
  Table 5 provides liberalization scenarios by mode of service delivery, assuming an equal 
split of price markups between rents and costs in the benchmark.  Assume that Tunisia eliminates 
all border barriers (mode one barriers) on tradable services, and does so on a non-discriminatory 
                                                 
9 As discussed in Anderson and van Wincoop (2001), liberalization of trade costs that generate rents for 
home agents have smaller welfare impacts than liberalization of “real” trade costs that absorb resources.   16
or most-favored-nation (MFN) basis.  This would raise welfare, as measured by equivalent 
variation in the representative agent’s real income, by about 1.2 percent.  The model also 
simulates impacts on the real wage and return on capital.  While both factors would gain, the 
benefits would be larger for capital (a 1.32 percent increase in price), with the real wage 
increasing by less than one percent.  In terms of factor adjustment, 0.8 percent of the labor force 
and one percent of capital would turn over industry of employment.   
The investment liberalization (mode 3) scenario shown in column 2 of Table 5 is the 
same as that discussed above (column 2 of Table 4).  Finally, the aggregate impact of liberalizing 
both investment barriers and border barriers (modes one and three) is slightly more than additive 
as shown in column 3, raising welfare by 5.3 percent.  Note that roughly 75.5 percent of 
estimated welfare gains may be attributed to investment liberalization, while 23.0 percent are due 
to border liberalization.  This leaves a small positive residual gain of 1.5 percent that stems from 
the fact that both types of barriers together interact to generate a larger income loss than they 
would separately.  It is interesting that this interaction process affects labor and capital 
differently.  The individual liberalization impacts on the real wage sum to less than the joint 
impact of full liberalization, suggesting that the barriers interact to restrain wages.  The opposite 
is true for the real price of capital.  Finally, note in the bottom panel that any policy reform 
expands the share of services compared to the initial benchmark.  However, mode 1 liberalization 
favors manufacturing and mining over full liberalization in mode 1 and mode 3, which favors 
agriculture and services.  Indeed, full services liberalization would increase the services share of 
GDP from 40.7 percent to 43.6 percent, a large shift in relative output.   
It is possible also to consider the gains from liberalizing individual service sectors, as 
reported in Table 6.
10  For this purpose we compute the impacts of liberalizing both mode 1 and 
mode 3 delivery options in six of the 11 tradable service sectors.  About 41 percent of the welfare 
                                                 
10 Note that sector-level reforms are assumed to occur in isolation while full liberalization entails the 
simultaneous liberalization of all modeled service sectors.  The aggregate impact does not equal the sum of   17
gains of full liberalization may be attributed to reforms in financial and transportation sectors.  
The impact of liberalization in business services, distribution, and communications are also 
substantial.  Note that these individual trade reforms are not neutral with respect to factor prices.  
Opening up the construction sector would actually reduce the real wage moderately.  Capital 
income would gain significantly from liberalization of transportation, business services, and 
finance.   
  The final set of scenarios compares liberalization of goods and services.  Goods-trade 
liberalization is modeled as a non-discriminatory and unilateral elimination of the commodity 
tariffs given in Table 2.  Results are shown in Table 7.  Household welfare is estimated to 
increase by 1.5 percent, in contrast to the 5.3 percent gain from full services liberalization.  As 
trade theory would predict, the gains are largely experienced by the abundant factor, labor, while 
there is relatively little change in the price of other value added.  The wage increases nearly 19 
percent while returns to capital increase 3.5 percent.  Factor turnover is also quite high at 10 
percent for both workers and capital.  There is a significant increase in the manufacturing share of 
total output from 32.8 percent in the benchmark to 42.8 percent in the free goods-trade 
environment.  Agriculture declines substantially as a relative component of output, as does 
services. 
  Liberalizing services barriers and goods tariffs simultaneously yields a potential gain in 
welfare of 6.7 percent.  These gains are less than the sum available under the isolated 
liberalization packages, indicating that there is a somewhat offsetting interaction between the two 
commitments.  Gains from joint liberalization, however, are more evenly distributed across labor 
and capital than they are in either individual reform.  Thus, removal of goods tariffs strongly 
favors labor while removal of services barriers favors capital.  Both factors experience significant 
real price increases with joint liberalization.   
                                                                                                                                                 
the sectoral impacts due to interactions between sectors with joint liberalization.   18
  Interestingly, the structure of output with full liberalization of both goods and services is 
closer to that with an isolated service liberalization than to one with solely goods tariff 
elimination, as noted in the bottom panel.  Thus, in an important sense, removing commodity 
tariffs without services liberalization tends to “over-adjust” the economy toward manufacturing 
and away from agriculture and services.  Freeing up services moves the structure back toward the 
fully efficient outcome in the final column.  Indeed, a pure goods-trade liberalization results in a 
much greater movement of labor and more dramatic changes in the composition of production. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
  This paper considers how services liberalization differs from that of goods liberalization 
using an applied general equilibrium model of Tunisia’s economy.  Not surprisingly, goods-trade 
liberalization reorients production towards manufacturing (especially in textile and electronics) in 
line with Tunisia’s benchmark comparative advantage.  In contrast, the overall composition of 
production with service liberalization remains fairly stable, with only slight increases in 
manufacturing and service provision and a small decrease in agriculture and mining.  The 
distribution of gain under service liberalization are more evenly distributed across factors than 
those under goods liberalization, where gains are strongly concentrated in the hands of workers 
(the abundant factor).  Fewer workers are required to change positions to accommodate service 
liberalization, implying less impact on frictional unemployment.  Thus, we might expect less 
political resistance to services liberalization relative to goods liberalization.   
  Interestingly, combining goods and services liberalization appears to offer the best of 
both worlds.  The gains from jointly freeing up goods and services are nearly additive of the two 
independent reforms.  Yet the overall structure of the economy remains similar to that of the 
benchmark, with relatively small changes in the employment location of workers.  Services 
liberalization therefore eases the adjustment costs involved in the liberalization of goods trade as   19
the expansion of economic activity would no longer be restrained by the lagging competitiveness 
of Tunisia’s service sector. 
  The potential welfare implications of services liberalization are clearly positive and 
substantial.  Even given modest assumptions about the current environment for trade in services, 
welfare (measured as equivalent variation) and GDP are both estimated to increase more than 
seven percent.  These gains are more than three times the magnitude of the estimated gains from 
goods-trade liberalization alone.  Further, perhaps 75 percent of services liberalization gains are 
to be achieved from the liberalization of foreign investment barriers that impede mode 3 delivery 
of services.  Granting the right of establishment to foreign firms stands to increase real household 
income by four percent.  In contrast, liberalization of cross-border trade in services (mode 1) 
results in a roughly one percent gain in household income.   
  The uncertainty surrounding estimated price wedges and the allocation of those wedges 
between rent and production inefficiency deserve further exploration.  Improved estimates of 
services barriers are critical for a more accurate determination of the magnitude of the potential 
impacts of liberalization.  It is important to note that cautious assumptions were made here about 
the existing distortions and the potential competitive effects and efficiency improvements with 
liberalization.  It may be that a dramatic reform effort might bring even greater gains than those 
reported here.     20
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APPENDIX: MODEL EQUATIONS AND NOTATION 
A.  Production 




  2. Imported Intermediates  MiN = [ΣrδrimriN
(ηi-1)/ ηi]
 ηi/(ηi-1) 
  3. Composite Intermediate  zji = [γdidji
(ηj-1)/ ηj + γmimji
(ηj-1)/ ηj]
 ηj/(ηj-1) 
  4. Final Goods Technology  Yi = min[z1i/a1i,..,zni/ani,Vi/aVA] 




  6. Export Allocation  Xi = [ΣrβriXri
(ei-1)/ei]
ei/(ei-1) 
  7. Marginal Cost Condition  (1+λi)ciYi = Σj(1+vj)pjdji + ΣjΣr(1+uj+trj)prj
mmrji  
                                  + (wKKi + wLL1i) 
B.  Utility  
  8. Utility Function  U = ΠiCi
bi ;  Σibi = 1 
  9. Domestic & Import Consumption  Ci = [φDiDiC
(ψi-1)/ ψi + φMiCMiC
(ψi-1)/ ψi]
 ψi/ψi-i 
      (applies also to Gi and Ii
F) 
 10. Import Allocation  MiC = [ΣrδriMric
(ηi-1)/ ηi]
 ηi/ηi-1 
      (applies also to MiG and MiI
F) 
C. Constraints and Balancing Items 
 11. Agent's Budget Constraint  Σi ~ pi
CCi = wK EK + wLΣiLi + - Σi ~ pi
IFIi
F 
                    -ΣipiIi
I - r
FK
F - D + Σi viYi
  
 12. Government Budget Constraint  Σi ~ pi
G Gi = D +ΣiτVi ~ pi
C Vi + ΣiΣr tripri
m(MriC+MriI
F) 







 14. Product Market Clearance  Si = ΣjaijYj + Gi + Ii
F + Ii
I + Ci 
 15. Factor Market Clearance  ΣiKi = K E ;  ΣiLi  = 1L E  
 16. Zero Profits  pi Di + Σrpri
x  Xri = ciYi  
 17. Supply Value Balance  ~ pi Si =~ pi
Z Σjaij(1+vi)Yj +  ~ pi
C DiC+~ pi
IFDiI
F + ~ pi
G DiG 
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D. Price Relationships and Identities 
 18. Components of Domestic Sales  Di = DiC + DiI
F + Ii
I + DiG 
 19. Components of Import Sales  Mi = MiN + MiC + MiI
F + MiG 
 20. Domestic Price of Intermediate Imports   pri
N = (1 + ui + tri)pri
m 
         (holds also for imports for G) 
 21. Domestic Price of Imports for C   pri
C = (1 + ui + tri)pri
m 
         (holds also for imports for I
F) 
 22. Consumer Price of Domestic Goods  pi
C = (1 + vi)pi 
         (holds also for purchases for I
F) 
 23. Capital-Market Equilibrium  τK1 + wK1 = ... = τKn + wKn  (mobile capital sectors) 
 
LIST OF VARIABLES 
 Li   Domestic labor inputs, sector i (i=1,..,34) 
 Ki  Capital (other value added) inputs, both mobile and immobile 
 Vi Value  added 
 Mi Total  imports 
 Mri  Imports from region r (r = EU, MENA, ROW) 
 MiN  Imports of commodity i for intermediate use 
 mriN  Imports for intermediate use from region r (r =  EU, MENA, ROW) 
 zji  Composite intermediate input of j into i (j=1,...,34)    
 dji, mji  Intermediate usages of domestic and imported goods 
 Yi  Output of good i 
 Di, Xi  Output for domestic sales and exports 
 DiC, DiG, DiI
F  Domestic sales: private and public consumption, capital formation 
 Xri  Exports of good i to region r 
 ci  Index of marginal cost of production 
 pi  Domestic producer price index 
~ pi
Z ,~ pi
C , ~ pi
IF,~ pi
G   Domestic price indexes (home and imported prices) 
 wK, wL  Factor price indexes 
 U  Utility 
 ~ pi   Composite price index for total domestic supply 
 Ci, Gi  Private and public consumption 
 Ii
F, Ii
I  Fixed capital formation and inventory investment 
 MiC, MiG  Imports for private and public consumption   23
 MiI
F  Imports for fixed capital formation 
 MriC, MriG  Imports for private and public consumption from region r  
 MriI
F  Imports for fixed capital formation from region r 
 K
F  Net payments on foreign capital holdings 
 e  Real exchange rate (price index for foreign exchange) 
 B  Current-account balance  
 D  Government budget deficit (held fixed) 
 Si  Supply on domestic market (Di + Mi) 
 pri
N  Domestic price index for intermediate imports 
 pri
C, pri
G  Domestic price indexes for imports of private and public consumption 
 priI
F  Domestic price index for imports for gross capital formation 
 pi
C, piI
F  Price index for private consumption/fixed capital of domestic goods 
 pri  Producer price index for goods exported to region r 
 
LIST OF PARAMETERS 
 σi  Substitution elasticity between capital and labor 
 ηa  Substitution elasticity between intermediates and value added 
 ηi  Armington elasticity on imports between regions  
 ηj  Substitution elasticity between domestic and imported intermediates 
 εi Transformation  elasticity  between domestic and exported output 
 ei Transformation  elasticity  on exports between regions 
 ψi  Substitution elasticity between domestic and imported consumption 
 tri  Tariff rate on imports from region r (tri= 0 for service sectors) 
 ui  Resource-using services border barriers (ui=0 for non-service sectors) 
 vi  Service rents on output (vi=0 for non-service sectors) 
 λi  Service resource-using barriers on output (λi=0 for non-service sectors) 
  K E ,  1L E   Endowment of capital and labor 
 pri
m  Price of imports from region r  
 pri
x  Price of exports in region r 
 r
F   Price of foreign capital payments  
 
   24
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AGGREGATE SECTORS (% of total) 
  Agriculture and Fishing  17.5  10.2  32.4  20.1  6.6 
  Manufacturing  30.0  63.2  29.7  51.3  55.3 
  Utilities, Mining, Petroleum  5.8  5.8  4.0  10.9  6.8 
  Services  46.7  20.8  33.8  17.7  31.2 
         
SERVICE SECTORS (% of total)       
Construction  8.2  0.0 0.3 0.4  0.0 
Distribution/Commerce  6.9  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
Transportation  5.6  2.7 5.7 4.3  8.7 
Communication  1.0  0.1 0.3 1.7  0.4 
Hotel  1.5  0.0 3.9 0.1  0.0 
Restaurant 4.1  0.0  10.9  0.0  0.0 
Finance  2.5  0.2 0.1 4.8  0.3 
Insurance  0.3  0.2 0.3 0.6  0.0 
Business  1.4  2.1 0.1 2.5  2.5 
Real  Estate  2.6  0.0 5.0 1.3  0.0 
Repair  1.3  0.0 1.1 1.8  0.0 
Health and Education  2.0  0.0  4.9  0.2  0.0 
Public  9.0  0.0 0.6 0.0  0.0 
Other  Services  0.2  0.0 0.6 0.0  0.0 
Tourism  --  15.4 -- --  19.3 
Institute National de la Statistique, 1998, Les Comptes de la Nation Base 1983, agregats et tableaux d'ensemble 1993-
1997.   28
Table 2:  Benchmark Trade Shares and Tariffs 
  
EU Trade Share (%)
Trade-Weighted  
Import Tariff 
Sectors  Imports  Exports  EU Rest of World
Agriculture 38.7  68.7  13.5  13.0 
Process Foods  55.3  71.9  17.6  18.5 
Chemicals and Glass  48.8  24.0  21.1  23.6 
Non-Ferreous Metals 57.7  70.4  15.3  21.2 
Metalwork 67.8  58.8  15.3  17.5 
Machinery 77.0  86.0  6.5  8.5 
Automobiles & Trucks  87.6  40.8  6.3  10.8 
Automobile parts  57.1  71.0  0.1  1.7 
Electrical Parts  66.4  50.4  4.3  7.8 
Electronics 66.4  50.4  4.3  7.8 
Household Appliances  66.4  50.4  4.3  7.8 
Chemicals 75.7  39.2  9.0  10.3 
Clothing & Textiles  92.3  94.8  17.7  21.6 
Leather 93.3  96.6  25.1  28.3 
Wood 41.1  66.7  16.4  16.6 
Paper 74.4  20.6  11.1  5.3 
Plastics 72.9  28.0  14.5  18.7 
Other Manufacturing  72.9  76.2  8.1  15.8 
Mining 30.6  86.0  17.4  2.5 
Petroleum 63.3  38.7  12.2  20.2 
Services 70.0  76.0     
 
Table 3: Barriers to Trade in Services (NTB ad valorem price equivalent %) 




Construction  nt  3 
Distribution  nt  5 
Transportation 50  3 
Communications 200  30 
Hotel   nt  3 
Restaurant  nt  3 
Finance 30  30 
Insurance 50  50 
Business, Insurance & Leasing  10  10 
Real Estate  10  10 
Repair  nt  3 
Health and Education  nt  nt 
Public  nt  nt 
Other Services  nt  nt 
    
  nt non-traded modes of supply   29
Table 4: Liberalization of Foreign Direct Investment in Services 
 
Rent wedge: 100% 
Cost wedge: 0% 
Baseline Scenario 
Rent wedge: 50% 
Cost wedge: 50% 
Rent wedge: 0% 
Cost wedge: 100% 
Macroeconomic Variables (% change)       
   Welfare, Household Income (EV)  0.33  4.00  7.68 
   Consumer price index (CPI)  -7.09  -7.11  -7.13 
   Price of Labor  4.39  3.19  2.04 
   Price of Capital  6.55  6.99  7.43 
   Labor turnover  3.44  3.42  3.78 
   Capital Turnover  4.87  4.90  5.06 
Production (share of GDP)       
   Agriculture    (bench = 19.5  percent)  21.1 21.2 21.3 
   Manufacturing            (32.8 percent)  28.5  28.7  28.9 
   Mining and Utilities     (7.0 percent)  6.8  6.8  6.7 
   Services                       (40.7 percent)  43.6  43.3  43.1 
 
 








Macroeconomic Variables (% change)       
   Welfare, Household Income (EV)  1.22  4.00  5.30 
   Consumer price index  -1.02  -7.11  -8.04 
   Price of Labor  0.57  3.19  4.23 
   Price of Capital  1.32  6.99  8.23 
   Labor turnover  0.78  3.42  3.73 
   Capital Turnover  0.98  4.90  5.35 
Production (share of GDP)      
   Agriculture    (bench = 19.5  percent)  19.9 21.2 21.4 
   Manufacturing            (32.8 percent)  31.7  28.7  28.2 
   Mining and Utilities     (7.0 percent)  7.1  6.8  6.8 
   Services                       (40.7 percent)  41.3  43.3  43.6 
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Welfare  (EV)  0.46  0.32 1.09  0.60 0.44  1.08  5.30 
Price  Labor  0.90  -0.13  0.62  0.66  1.23 0.60 4.23 
Price  Capital  0.46  0.10 1.44  1.69 0.54  2.29  8.23 
Labor  Turnover    0.35  0.15 1.03  1.34 0.68  1.84  3.73 
Capital  Turnover 0.40  0.11 1.23  1.89 0.89  2.62  5.35 
 
 










Macroeconomic Variables (% change)      
   Welfare, Household Income (EV)  1.52  5.30  6.67 
   Consumer price index  -1.07  -8.04  -9.07 
   Price of Labor  18.93  4.23  17.67 
   Price of Capital  3.46  8.23  13.61 
   Labor turnover  9.83  3.73  3.40 
   Capital Turnover  10.38  5.35  5.89 
Production (share of GDP)      
   Agriculture    (bench = 19.5 percent)  15.3  21.4  19.1 
   Manufacturing            (32.8 percent)  42.8  28.2  33.6 
   Mining and Utilities     (7.0 percent)  5.2  6.8  5.6 
   Services                       (40.7 percent)  36.7  43.6  41.7 
 